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Anthony N. Doob and Michael Tonry
Varieties of Youth Justice
Like parents trying to figure how best to raise their children, countries
have, in recent years, wrestled with the question of how to respond to
youths who break laws. There are many different models. Few appear
to work in a completely satisfactory manner from the perspective of
those in each jurisdiction. There is not even consensus on what "youth
justice systems" (where they exist) are trying to accomplish. Few deci-
sions-other than that youths are different from adults-have been
settled in the same way across jurisdictions. The manner in which each
country has resolved the "youth justice" problem is almost certainly
best understood within the broad context of that country's history and
justice institutions. Hence it would be premature to carry out a true
multicultural cross-jurisdictional study of youth justice systems without
first attempting to understand each system within its own context. The
essays in this volume represent an attempt to understand each system
within the cultural context in which it exists.
Many jurisdictions are searching for new and better approaches for
dealing with youth crime. It is as if, in the latter part of the twentieth
century, many countries suddenly discovered that there was more than
one way of responding to youths who offend. Principles, purposes, and
procedures all changed, but the ambivalence within each community
remained.
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Institute of Criminology, Cambridge University, and Sonosky Professor of Law and
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Anthony N. Doob and Michael Tonry
Approaches to youth justice are sometimes caricatured as falling at
different points along a dimension of which one pole is a "pure" wel-
fare model and the other is a "pure" criminal law or punishment
model. Although this is an oversimplification, the tension that exists
between responding to youths who have offended in terms of their so-
cial or psychological needs, and punishing them for what they have
done, is part of the story of youth justice in many jurisdictions. Various
essays in this volume illustrate that a criminal law approach need not
be particularly punitive, nor a child welfare approach particularly effec-
tive.
Policy makers and practitioners often are not comfortable making
clear distinctions between these two approaches. Snyder and Sickmund
(1999, p. 87) suggest that most states in the United States have not
been able to decide between them. Hence, they characterize thirty-two
states as having both a "prevention/diversion/treatment" orientation
and a "punishment" orientation in their legislated goals. The other
eighteen jurisdictions are evenly split in their legislative goals between
"punishment" and "child welfare" orientations. These stated goals are
not unimportant, but seldom do they determine what actually happens.
This essay explores the variation that exists in the eight jurisdictions
discussed in this volume. Section I describes one of the most important
single facts about youth justice systems: a separate youth justice system
is not necessary to ensure that youths are dealt with differently than
are adults processed in the adult system. Section II outlines the com-
plexity of the age limits of youth justice systems. Youth justice systems
in many countries were quite stable until roughly 1970 or so. In the
latter part of the twentieth century, however, many experienced
changes, sometimes quite rapid, and often quite unprincipled. These
changes are discussed in Section I1. Section IV describes one aspect
of the changes that took place in many countries-how various juris-
dictions reconciled the tension between welfare principles and criminal
law or punishment principles. Finally, in Section V, we note the con-
trasts between law in books and law in action. Understanding any
youth justice system requires one to look not only at the formal legal
structure but at how it operates in practice.
I. Separate Systems?
Youth justice systems vary much more between countries than do adult
systems. Adult systems vary in many detailed ways but are broadly sim-
ilar in most important respects. There is a good deal of consensus
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about what constitutes an offense. The exact nature of the prosecution
process and court structures differs (especially between common-law
and European countries), but there is widespread agreement that, at
the end of the process, the sentence should, to a large extent, reflect
the seriousness of the offense. Whatever else a sentence was said to
accomplish, it would be seen unambiguously as punishment by the
community and by the person subject to it. Sentencing systems in
many countries have changed in the last thirty years-sometimes dra-
matically-but the focus of the sentence is more likely to be on the
severity of punishment, rather than its purposes.
Youth justice systems do not have these same basic similarities. To
give one illustration, what are commonly known as "status offenses"-
behavior that is prohibited only because of a person's status as a youth
(e.g., curfews, truancy) exist in some jurisdictions (e.g., in many U.S.
states) but not in others (e.g., Canada, Denmark, or Germany).
Nor do all youth justice systems feature the same core features. In
England and many U.S. states, youth justice systems closely resemble
adult courts in their organization and their focus on punishment as a
primary aim. In Scandinavian countries, people below age fifteen are
legally incapable of committing crimes, and their serious misconduct
is dealt with by social welfare agencies. At and after age fifteen, young
offenders are processed by the same courts as process adults. In Scot-
land, a strong social welfare ethos dominates handling of young of-
fenders. In New Zealand, nearly all cases are handled by conferences
that many see as premised in part on ideas akin to those embodied in
restorative justice.
The most notable aspect of the treatment of youths who offend in
Western countries is that every country appears to have laws or poli-
cies reflecting the belief that youths should be treated differently from
adult offenders. Exactly how they should be treated differently varies
from country to country. What constitutes a "youth" also varies from
country to country. And the rigidity of the demarcations between a
child who is not criminally responsible and a youth who might be, and
the demarcations between youthfulness and adulthood, also vary. But
those responsible for criminal laws in all countries examined in this
volume seem to agree that there should be some form of separation in
how youthful and adult offenders are treated.
Accounts of juvenile justice history in the United States often focus
on 1899 (the date of the founding of the first American separate court
for juveniles in Chicago), just as Canadian juvenile justice is seen as
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dating from the first comprehensive "delinquency" legislation in 1908
or the first juvenile court in 1894. The experience of others, however,
instructs that the formal beginnings of a "separate" youth justice sys-
tem may not be especially important. The formal creation of a juvenile
court is not necessary for there to be what is, from an operational
standpoint, a separate youth justice system. Formal separation of juve-
nile from adult systems, exemplified by the "founding" of a juvenile
court, may be no more than a North American idiosyncrasy and less
important than the administrative structures and practices that deter-
mine a society's responses to youthful offending.
In Denmark, there is no formally separate system for young offend-
ers. There are no special courts, and there are no special offenses (i.e.,
there are no status offenses). Denmark does not appear to have had a
formally separate system (with distinct youth justice laws and a com-
pletely distinct set of youth justice institutions) for youths who offend.
A naive American, therefore, might think that Denmark had not pro-
gressed even as far as reforms introduced in the early twentieth century
in Chicago. As Kyvsgaard's essay in this volume demonstrates, how-
ever, that does not mean that Danish youths are treated as if they are
adults. Clearly they are not.
The Swedish system of youth justice has similar characteristics.
Early twentieth-century American reformers would be dismayed to
find that those over the age of criminal responsibility (fifteen) in Swe-
den are dealt with in the criminal courts. The system that existed at
the end of the twentieth century-with shared responsibility between
the welfare system and the justice system-for those between ages fif-
teen and twenty-does not sound like a "separate justice system."
Nevertheless, various rules identified by Janson in this volume differ-
entiate the treatment of a sixteen-year-old from that of a twenty-one-
year-old and add up to, in effect, a separate system. Youths between
ages fifteen and seventeen, for example, cannot normally be sent to
prison.
These two examples highlight the importance of looking at how
youth justice systems work rather than exclusively at formal laws and
institutions. Furthermore, it is well established that in the United
States and Canada there were many aspects of a separate youth justice
system, including separate custodial institutions and probation officers
for juveniles, in place long before the establishment of the youth courts
in Chicago and Toronto.
The tendency of most countries represented in this volume, how-
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ever, was to establish some form of separate set of formal rules for
youthful offenders. Beyond that, however, the similarity-at least at
the level of the underlying operating theory-more or less disappears.
It is difficult to find many similarities among England's preponderantly
punitive system, the Scottish system of children's hearings, New
Zealand's conferences, and the juvenile courts in the Netherlands.
Similarly, the influence of international conventions (the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Liberties and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child) on European youth justice (see, in particular, Junger-Tas's dis-
cussion with respect to the Netherlands and Kyvsgaard's concerning
Denmark) is not likely to have been anticipated by an American whose
country is not even a signatory to the U.N. Convention.
But all of these "systems" have one important common element: all
reflect the view that youths should be dealt with differently from
adults. And, generally speaking, the assumption is that the youthfulness
of an offender mitigates the punishment that youths should receive and
that youths should be kept separate from adult offenders.
II. Age Limits
Many countries-Canada and Germany, for example-appear to have
quite rigid demarcations between the system for dealing with youthful
offending, the adult system of criminal justice, and the welfare system.
One might suppose that these demarcations had meaningful refer-
ents-that youths are different the day after their eighteenth birthdays
from the way they were the day before, or that the homeless seven-
teen-year-old who steals something to eat is different from the home-
less seventeen-year-old who obtains food through some legal process.
When the more fluid systems of Denmark and Sweden are compared
to the more rigid systems of Canada or many American states, it is
clear that there are advantages and disadvantages to each.
Countries vary widely in both minimum ages of criminal responsi-
bility, before which a young person cannot be charged with a crime,
and jurisdictional ages of youth courts. Snyder and Sickmund (1999, p.
93) present such data for the U.S. states that demonstrate wide varia-
tion. For example, the age of criminal responsibility is six in North
Carolina and seven in Massachusetts, Maryland, and New York. The
maximum ages of jurisdiction of the youth courts vary from fifteen
(e.g., New York, North Carolina, and Connecticut) to seventeen (for
Anthony N. Doob and Michael Tonry
TABLE 1
Minimum and Maximum Ages of Youth Court Jurisdiction
by Country
Jurisdiction Minimum Age Maximum Age
Canada 12 17*
Netherlands 12 17
Germany 14 17
England 10 17
Scotland 8 15
United States (typically) 10 17
Sweden 15 Not relevant
Denmark 15 Not relevant
New Zealand 14 16
* This is the maximum age, meaning that the young person is a youth until the eigh-
teenth birthday. Hence, "15" means up to the sixteenth birthday.
most states). Such data are useful for certain purposes, but can easily
give a false impression of stability and certainty.
Table 1 shows maximum and minimum ages of youth court jurisdic-
tion for the countries represented in this volume and the United
States. Minimum ages vary widely, from eight to fifteen. In most coun-
tries adult court jurisdiction begins at age eighteen. Denmark and Swe-
den have no specialized youth court, so "adult" jurisdiction begins at
age fifteen.
These data, then, would give an impression of similarity at the top
age for five of the ten jurisdictions, and considerable variability at the
bottom. They obscure, however, two phenomena. First, these ages
have been, in some jurisdictions, unstable over time. These were the
correct ages when these essays were written. In some jurisdictions,
however, the ages have varied somewhat over time. More important,
however, we see that the ages are not necessarily as firm as they might
appear.
In Canada, the minimum age (twelve) was established in 1984. Prior
to that, it had been seven. Until 1985, the maximum age had varied
between provinces, with some provinces declaring youths to be adults
at any age between sixteen and eighteen, or, in the case of Alberta,
different ages had been set for girls and boys. Until April 2003, youths
aged fourteen and above could be transferred into adult court. Indeed,
presumptively they were to be transferred into adult court if they were
at least sixteen years old at the time of the offense and were charged
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with certain serious violent offenses. If they were transferred, they
would, for almost all purposes, be treated as if, by judicial decision,
they had aged instantly into adulthood.
Since April 2003, youths charged with serious offenses remain
youths for criminal justice purposes and remain in youth court but can,
on application from the prosecutor, be sentenced as an adult if a judge
determines that a proportionate youth sentence is not possible because
the maximum permissible youth sentence is not long enough. Even
then, the judge can sentence the youth to serve his or her sentence in
a youth facility. To imply, then, that the juvenile justice law in Canada
has always maintained jurisdiction over youths for six years beginning
at the youth's twelfth birthday is an oversimplification, given that
transfers were possible before April 2003 and adult sentences are per-
missible after that date.
The Netherlands' youth justice system, on the dimensions described
in table 1, would appear to be very similar to Canada's. However, the
apparent similarity of the age range of the two countries results more
from coincidence than a similar development or similar principles. As
Junger-Tas notes in this volume, the first formal criminal code in the
Netherlands established, in 1809, that the minimum age of criminal
responsibility was twelve, and youths up to age eighteen were liable to
less severe sentences than were those ages eighteen and over. Only two
years later, however, the French occupation resulted in the abolition
of the minimum age, with judges having to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether the youth should be held criminally responsible. In 1881,
age fourteen became an important dividing point: those under age
fourteen were, in effect, kept out of prisons but held in community
facilities. In 1901, the maximum age was set at the eighteenth birthday,
and the minimum age was again abolished.
Chronological ages are relatively easy to define. What become more
murky, however, are situations where youths are deemed to be adults
because of what they did. As Junger-Tas notes, the Netherlands' 1995
Juvenile Justice Act changed the manner in which sixteen- and seven-
teen-year-olds could be transferred into the adult system. Earlier, three
conditions had to be met before a youth could be transferred: the of-
fense had to be serious, there had to be aggravating factors such as the
offense having been committed with adults, and the offender had to be
seen as, effectively, having the maturity of an adult. The legislation
that came into effect in 1995 changed this: only one of the conditions
had to be present, and the "age" criterion apparently became more fo-
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cused on the age of the offender at the time that the offense was com-
mitted rather than the youth's maturity. As an additional complication
related to the issue of age, the maximum period of detention was
changed with the new act so that those aged twelve through fifteen are
liable to receive a maximum of a one-year sentence and those ages six-
teen or seventeen at the time of the offense are liable to receive a two-
year sentence.
The lower limit of criminal responsibility, on the surface identical to
Canada's (age twelve), has become somewhat permeable. Junger-Tas
describes a special project-called STOP-that focuses on minor in-
fractions of the law by those under age twelve. Police are allowed to
arrest these youths who, according to the "tabled" data, are below the
age of criminal responsibility in the Netherlands. The police can pro-
pose an intervention by social workers, but formally this intervention
requires parental approval. As Junger-Tas notes, increased transfer to
adult court of those over age sixteen combined with increased use of
STOP have the practical effect of lowering both of the age limits of
the juvenile justice system. Said differently, these easy-to-define rigid
dates have become less determinative.
The German Youth Court Law came into effect in 1923 and pro-
vided the framework for the state's response to offending by those be-
tween their fourteenth and eighteenth birthdays. Special courts and
prisons for youths had existed before that time. Germany, Albrecht
notes in this volume, has endorsed for approximately a century the idea
that punishment is not the best approach to youthful offending. Nev-
ertheless, in 1943, the Nazi government lowered the age of criminal
responsibility to twelve and allowed the transfer to the adult system of
offenders aged sixteen and over. These changes lasted only three years,
however. But the age limits set out in the legislation are not quite as
firm as would be implied by a table of minimum and maximum ages.
Young adults, aged eighteen to twenty, can be prosecuted as if they
were juveniles. In effect, there is the possibility of a transfer down be-
cause of variation in "maturation, social and moral development, and
integration into the adult world" (Albrecht, in this volume). Germa-
ny's maximum age of seventeen is, then, very different from those ages
found in American states.
The "age jurisdiction" for England appears to be fairly simple.
However, within the range of juvenile jurisdiction, variation does exist.
Until 1998 there were special restrictions on the use of custody for
those under fifteen, but these restrictions were relaxed by the 1998 leg-
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islation. In addition, youths in England can be dealt with by the Crown
(adult) Court rather than by the youth court. In serious cases, the
youth is in jeopardy of receiving the same sentence an adult would re-
ceive. In the case of a homicide offense, committal to the Crown Court
is mandatory. That is why probably England's most famous recent
youth offense-the case involving two ten-year-old youths who killed
James Bulger in 1992-was held in Crown Court and received full
publicity. Interestingly, when the two youths found guilty of the of-
fense were released as young adults, the government felt it necessary
to protect their identities so that they could integrate into civil society.
But the lower age limit in England is being weakened in other ways.
As Bottoms and Dignan note in this volume, children aged nine and
under run the risk of formal intervention if they do something that
could be considered criminal or if they misbehave in other ways.
Though technically it is a civil proceeding, the child can be placed un-
der the supervision of a social worker for what would otherwise be
criminal behavior. Furthermore, the court is given powers to impose
conditions designed to prevent future similar behavior. The difference
between a criminal and a civil proceeding is probably somewhat ob-
scure to the nine-year-old with restrictions on his freedom.
The age jurisdiction of the juvenile system in the United States var-
ies from state to state, though the modal ages would appear to be simi-
lar to those in the United Kingdom. However, that is where the simi-
larity ends. In particular, two factors must be considered. Even at the
lowest age, in certain states, youths under twelve years old can be pros-
ecuted as if they are adults.
More common is the ambiguity about the age jurisdiction at the top
end. It is estimated that as many as 200,000 youths a year under the
age of eighteen are processed in the adult courts in the United States
as if they were adults.
In comparison, Canada, with about one-tenth as many youths as the
United States, transferred fewer than 100 youths per year to adult
courts even though the overall use of youth court appears to be rela-
tively comparable in the two jurisdictions (Sprott and Snyder 1999).
Most of the American youths who end up in adult court are not there
as a result of judicially ordered waivers. In a few states (e.g., New
York), there is no "judicial waiver" to adult court (Szymanski 2002).
Instead, two mechanisms account for most of these "instant adults."
In many states, prosecutors have the power to decide that an offender
should be dealt with as an adult. If the indictment is filed in the adult
10 Anthony N. Doob and Michael Tonry
court, the youth is, then, for criminal justice purposes, an adult. Alter-
natively, some state legislatures have decided that, for certain serious
offenses, a youth is to be considered to be an adult and the case is auto-
matically processed through the adult criminal courts. The idea that
the youth court jurisdiction is ages ten through seventeen, then, ap-
plies in many states only if the youth is lucky enough to avoid being
deemed to be an adult for criminal justice purposes.
For someone from England, the United States, or Canada looking
at youth justice systems, the idea of having a minimum age of criminal
responsibility at age fifteen would almost certainly be seen as com-
pletely unrealistic. Sweden and Denmark, however, appear to survive
quite well with such a system. When the youth is between the age of
fifteen and his or her twenty-first birthday, sanctions are handed down
by courts, but this period is described by Janson in this volume as part
of the transition to adulthood. As he notes, prison for a youth below
age eighteen requires "extraordinary" justification and between ages
eighteen and twenty requires "special" justification. In any case, those
under age twenty-one serve their time separately from adults. And,
equally clearly, youth under age fifteen who offend are not completely
ignored by the state.
If nothing else, the variation on what the upper and lower age limits
mean should demonstrate the complexity and the interrelatedness of
the various youth justice provisions that exist in Western countries. A
seventeen-year-old would be a youth in five countries we have men-
tioned. But if that seventeen-year-old were to offend, he or she might
well be treated in quite different ways-and decisions would be guided
by quite different principles-depending on the country.
III. Stability and Change
Though the age jurisdiction is one tangible way in which youth justice
systems in various countries have changed over the past 100 years,
more profound changes have taken place in some, but not all, coun-
tries. There appears to have been stability in these systems up until
the latter part of the twentieth century. Changes clearly occurred, but
dramatic and rapid changes did not occur until the last few decades of
the twentieth century.
In New Zealand, for example, the formal youth justice system
brought to the country by its colonizers started off as might be ex-
pected: the values and practices of its original inhabitants were largely
ignored in favor of a very British-sounding set of practices. From that
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time onward, there were many changes in how the justice system re-
sponded to youthful offenders. However, these changes were more
evolutionary than radical. In the late nineteenth century, neglected
children were sent to industrial schools, and youthful offenders could
end up in prison or industrial schools. In 1925, children's courts were
established, and the state's interpretation of the "best interests" of the
child ostensibly defined what happened to youthful offenders. In the
19 50s and 1960s some modifications were made-allowing for more
punitive responses for older children and for the raising of the age of
criminal responsibility from seven to ten.
Things began to change more radically in 1974 when, among other
things, a distinction was made between those over and under age four-
teen. In particular, the age of criminal responsibility (ten) and the age
of prosecution (fourteen) were distinguished. This can be seen as an
early sign of what New Zealand is today best known for-the involve-
ment of families and local communities in decisions concerning youth-
ful offenders. The legislative changes apparently did not have the im-
pact expected, and the law itself was repeatedly amended over the next
ten years. In 1989, the most radical change occurred when the youth
justice legislation for which New Zealand is well known was intro-
duced-a system that focuses, more than others described in this vol-
ume, on conferencing processes to decide how to deal with youthful
offenders.
Canada's stability is easier to describe. The federal law that estab-
lished a separate youth justice system in 1908 remained essentially un-
touched for seventy-six years. The 1984 law lasted only until 2003, but
even that law was changed in symbolically important ways three times
during its nineteen-year history. The changes that took place in the
past twenty-five years, however, transformed Canada's youth justice
system from a clearly welfare-oriented system (though technically un-
der the federal government's criminal law jurisdiction) to a system
based largely on accountability and responses proportional to the of-
fense that was committed.
Scotland's history looks, on the surface, to be quite similar to Cana-
da's in the sense that there was a period of long stability followed by
change relatively late in the twentieth century. The Children Act of
1908 established a separate juvenile court that remained largely un-
changed until 1968. At that point, the Social Work (Scotland) Act,
which was fully implemented in 1971, set up a completely new system
of "children's hearings." These remained largely intact until the early
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twenty-first century, though very recently changes again are being dis-
cussed.
England, as Bottoms and Dignan point out in this volume, had a
history that appeared to be similar to that of Scotland until the 1960s.
At that point, the two jurisdictions diverged dramatically. That diver-
gence can be characterized on two dimensions: youth justice principles
and the stability of the laws. The 1969 English legislation created what
Bottoms and Dignan in this volume describe as a "radical shake-up of
procedures, orders, and supporting service structures." The contro-
versy around these changes resulted, beginning in the 1970s, in an "of-
ten bewilderingly rapid [set of] changes in the English youth justice
system" from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s.
At the other extreme is Germany. As Albrecht notes in this volume,
the notable characteristic of youth justice in Germany is its stability
throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. There might
be two reasons for this stability. First, the law was founded on clear
criminal law principles; hence, the apparent disillusionment with social
welfare interventions for offending youths that might be seen as char-
acterizing other countries toward the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury was irrelevant in Germany. Second, there appears to have been a
widely shared philosophical basis for the German juvenile justice sys-
tem throughout the twentieth century: less criminal justice interven-
tion is better than more.
It is not clear why stability seems to have characterized some systems
and change has characterized others. To say that youth justice became
politicized toward the end of the twentieth century in some countries
but not others is only to restate the question.
IV. Welfare and "Justice"
The conflict between what are generally referred to as welfare princi-
ples and criminal law principles appears to have featured in at least
some of the changes that have taken place in the latter part of the
twentieth century. Criminal law, however, incorporates a number of
quite independent concepts. As contrasted with welfare, criminal law
can mean a greater focus on the offense rather than the offender, more
focus on due process issues, proportional responses to offending, or a
focus on punishment as a justification for intervention.
Every jurisdiction has had to grapple with this distinction in some
way. Even Germany, which had a criminal law basis for its youth jus-
tice system throughout the twentieth century, had to consider whether
Varieties of Youth Justice
social welfare concerns should be integrated into it. The prolonged
consideration in the 1960s and 1970s of whether to "shift" delin-
quency into the welfare system, Albrecht notes, was never imple-
mented and has since disappeared as an issue. Other countries-like
Canada-have moved from a system that gave priority to one principle
(welfare, under the law in effect from 1908 to 1984) to a law that came
into effect in 2003 that focuses initially, and perhaps primarily in most
cases, on the offense. Still others, as in many states in the United
States, focus on welfare issues within the juvenile court, but focus on
the offense (and criminal justice approaches) when dealing with rela-
tively serious offenses.
Welfare issues played out in different ways in Denmark, a country
with one of the more stable systems of dealing with youthful offenders.
There is no formally separate juvenile justice system in Denmark.
Kyvsgaard notes in this volume that Denmark's 1930 Criminal Code
allowed a form of indeterminate sentence to be handed down to young
offenders. These "youth prison sentences," which aimed at "educating
and training juveniles with criminal proclivities," were abolished in
1973 in part because of concerns related to the indeterminacy of the
sentence. Not until 2001 was a new special "youth sentence" reintro-
duced. Interestingly enough, the new youth sentence came about not
because of concerns about education or welfare of youths but because
of concerns about serious violent youthful offenders. Although not
used very often (fifty times per year), it is notable that a type of special
prison sentence that had been put in place seventy years earlier and
abolished thirty years earlier was reincarnated (though in a somewhat
different form) to accomplish the dual goal of rehabilitation and inca-
pacitation. Even in relatively stable Denmark, there is tension between
criminal law and child welfare.
The tension between a criminal law approach and a child welfare ap-
proach played out somewhat differently in the Netherlands. Although
for centuries the history of juvenile justice predominately focused on
the welfare tradition, more recently the system may have become more
repressive. It is described, however, as a hybrid of punitive and welfare
traditions. For most of the twentieth century, the system was largely
oriented toward the welfare of young offenders, rejecting, therefore,
the notion that the severity of the intervention or treatment should be
proportional to the offense. This changed in the 1980s when, in a man-
ner that was similar to that of other countries around this time, chil-
dren's rights became an issue. Junger-Tas's characterization, in this
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volume, of the shift in approach is blunt, and her statement no doubt
echoes in other countries: "The welfare approach to youth justice per-
sisted until the 1980s, when it became obsolete. One reason was its ex-
cesses." She notes-again with words that could apply to many coun-
tries-that "a more general problem was that most interventions had
no solid scientific basis. Far-reaching decisions taken on behalf of juve-
niles were based on shaky evidence and had a highly arbitrary quality."
The result is that criminal law principles ascended in importance in
1995, and criminal law principles appeared, in the Netherlands, to be
associated with more severe punishments for juveniles.
The association of welfare approaches to juvenile justice with le-
niency and criminal law or proportional sentencing with harshness is
being challenged (or at least tested) by Canada's shift to a proportional
(criminal law) model from a more mixed model of juvenile justice.
Canada explicitly endorsed proportionality principles in sentencing in
order to reduce the intrusion of the justice system into the lives of
young people. Its 2003 legislation has specific prohibitions against the
use of pretrial detention and prison for welfare purposes. The reasons
for these provisions are clear: too many youths were being detained
and sentenced to custody for welfare purposes. The preamble to the
legislation refers to the goal of reducing the overreliance on incarcera-
tion for nonviolent offenses. It is impossible to know, however,
whether this criminal law approach will result in reduced use of deten-
tion and custody.
Scotland's appears, on the surface, to be one of the apparently more
"pure" welfare approaches. As Bottoms and Dignan note in this vol-
ume, the contrast between Scotland and England is particularly inter-
esting because the two systems came out of the same legislative body,
the U.K. Parliament. In comparing the decidedly more welfare orien-
tation of the Scottish juvenile justice system to the more criminal law
system that exists in the south, one important difference must be borne
in mind. England's system deals with youths ages ten to seventeen (in-
clusive). In Scotland, an offender is no longer considered to be a youth
after the sixteenth birthday, but eight-year-olds can be brought to the
hearing as a result of an offense.
Hence a comparison of the welfare-oriented Scottish system with the
more criminal English system is also a comparison of a system dealing
with eight-to fifteen-year-olds with a system dealing with ten- to sev-
enteen-year-olds. The Scottish system, as Bottoms and Dignan point
out, deals in the same way with cases involving matters of "care" as it
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does with offenses. In all cases, the children's hearing and the court are
to deal with a child in such a way that "the welfare of that child
throughout his childhood shall be... [the] paramount consideration"
(Children [Scotland] Act 1995, sec. 16[1]). Indeed, the children's hear-
ing-probably the most distinctive aspect of the Scottish system-is to
be invoked not just when a child has committed an offense but when
it is in the child's interest that there be some form of compulsory care.
Compulsory outcomes, however, cannot be ordered unless they are in
the child's interest; the commission of an offense is not sufficient cause
for the state to intervene in the life of a young person.
But even in this welfare-oriented system, the threads of its welfare
orientation are beginning to unravel. In 1995, the law was changed so
that the primary role that welfare issues play in guiding outcomes can
be reduced if it is necessary for public protection from serious harm.
Apparently, this is rarely invoked. But even in Scotland, it seems, the
notion that the youth justice institutions can protect the public from
youth crime through the use of punishments has made its way into the
legislation, though less so into practice.
England, as Bottoms and Dignan point out, presents a dramatic con-
trast. In 1991, the separation of the care and crime functions became
complete. Crime was to be dealt with by the English youth court, and
care was sent to the family court. This separation appears to be stable.
One of the less obvious shifts away from a welfare model occurred
in New Zealand during the latter part of the twentieth century. The
New Zealand youth justice system is notable in large part because of
the emphasis that has been given, since 1989, to conferencing as a way
of resolving cases involving youthful offenders. Though conferencing
may not be seen as a "tough" response to youthful offending, its orien-
tation is clearly some distance from a welfare-intervention model. The
focus of a conference is more than simply a focus on the child.
We are not suggesting that a major focus on the welfare of children
can be assumed in the long term to be in unrelenting decline in West-
ern juvenile justice systems. However, as a generalization, its overall
importance as an organizing principle in many (but not all) systems
appears to be on the decline.
One reason may, of course, relate to the politicizing of youth justice
in many countries. As Roberts points out in this volume, the belief in
many countries that youth crime is increasing appears to fuel moves
to "do something" about the problem. Moving away from a welfare
orientation in dealing with youthful offenders may be one way of mak-
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ing the political point that a crime is a crime. Roberts quotes a former
Canadian minister of justice as saying in 1997 that "if people think vio-
lent crime is an increasing problem, then there is a problem that we
have to address," and "violent youth crime demands a strong re-
sponse"-a statement that clearly is not likely to be interpreted as be-
ing supportive of a welfare orientation. Similarly, Roberts notes that
mandatory sentencing laws in Australia were introduced in 1992 spe-
cifically to address concerns about leniency in the youth justice system.
Youth crime is an attractive territory for political opportunism since
tough legislation (e.g., the automatic processing as adults of youths
who murder, or mandatory sentences for very serious violent offenses)
can be enacted with relatively few political or financial costs. Few peo-
ple-or at least few of those who appear to influence political
agendas-view tough youth crime measures as being tough on youths.
Instead, they are seen as being tough on crime. But tough youth crime
measures have another political advantage. Compared to legislative
changes that affect sentencing generally (e.g., three-strikes laws for
adult offenders), a shift from a welfare orientation to a tough offense-
based system for the most serious offenders will not be likely to affect
many youths and, therefore, will not cost a great deal.
V. Law in Books and in Action
Much of the toughening in youth justice systems came after apparent
increases in youth crime leveled out. Much of the activity in the
United States occurred in the mid-to-late 1990s, for example. Crime
rates in the United States for adults and youths, including for violence,
peaked in the early 1990s and then dropped off. Roberts suggests that
extraordinary cases have sparked the moves in many countries toward
toughness. One of the clearest examples of this-but at the same time
one of the numerically least important-came in the mid-1990s in
Canada. In 1991, Canada had changed the test for transferring youths
to the adult justice system. It was a shift away from a balancing of the
welfare needs of the youth and protection of society toward a clearer
protection-of-society model. In 1995, legislation was once again intro-
duced to change the rules on the transfer of youths. This was done at
a time when there were no data on the effect of the earlier change, in
large part because only a few cases had been handled under the 1991
rules. What is, perhaps, most important about these changes is that
they had no apparent impact on the number of youth cases transferred
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to adult court. Few cases were transferred before the change, and the
change in the legislation apparently had no effect on transfers.
The distinction between law as it is written and law as it is adminis-
tered, then, is crucial in understanding a youth justice system. Canada,
with a single youth justice law administered by thirteen different juris-
dictions (ten provinces and three territories) demonstrates this: the
manner in which youths are processed varies dramatically across juris-
dictions. Furthermore, when legislation was enacted in the mid-1990s
that, among other things, encouraged the use of alternatives to cus-
tody, there were no apparent changes in the high-rate use of custodial
dispositions. Another broad, but little noticed, change that took place
without new legislation was the dramatic increase in the use of short
custodial sentences in the late 1980s in many provinces (Doob 1992).
In the case of this increase, there not only was no legislative change
but also little awareness, it seems, that this was occurring.
In Denmark, Kyvsgaard notes that between the 1950s and the 1990s
there was a dramatic shift in the proportion of youth cases handled
formally in the justice system. In the mid-1950s, only about 5 percent
of youths apprehended for offenses were found guilty, but by 2000 this
had increased to 77 percent. She notes that "this has not resulted from
specific amendments or deliberate youth policy changes, but has re-
sulted from general changes in legal usage and criticisms of withdraw-
als of charges for young offenders."
In Germany, for at least part of this period, the trend-again with-
out legislative direction-was in the opposite direction. During the
latter part of the twentieth century, there was increased diversion of
youths from the formal system, which led to complaints by the police
about underenforcement of the law.
In England during the latter part of 1980s, rates of formal pro-
cessing decreased, though in this case the exact reasons are known.
Other changes in the prosecution process-the establishment of the
Crown Prosecution Service and greater use of informal warnings by
the police-were responsible for the changes. However, why this trend
apparently continued into the 1990s in periods of rising (the early
1990s) and then falling crime (mid-1990s onward) is somewhat myste-
rious. Some of this change at the end of the century, Bottoms and Dig-
nan suggest, might be due to changes in offending (or at least appre-
hension) rates, but it is not clear how much can be attributed to this.
In Scotland, by contrast, formal processing increased over the past
twenty years.
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The most interesting explanation for the variability in the United
Kingdom is that there might be changes in confidence in the two juris-
dictions in the manner in which youths are processed. If the system is
trusted by the criminal justice community in Scotland, and youth jus-
tice officials (police, etc.) believe that youths will be handled appropri-
ately, it makes sense that the system would be increasingly used. In
England, Bottoms and Dignan suggest, the earlier days of minimum
intervention and the "new youth justice" initiatives did not earn the
confidence of the criminal justice community.
These are only a few examples of the large changes that occur in the
youth justice system independent of formal policy and formal legisla-
tive actions designed to create changes. Whatever the reasons for the
individual changes in specific countries, what is clear is that the modi-
fications reflect complex interactions of the law, the community in
which the law is being enforced, attitudes of justice officials and the
public, and the operation of other related institutions. Nothing is sim-
ple in the field of youth justice.
The latter part of the twentieth century and the early part of the
twenty-first century have been times when people in many countries
have been searching for the "right" solutions to youth justice prob-
lems. Compromises abound. As Walgrave notes in this volume in his
essay on one of the newest popular innovations in youth justice, restor-
ative justice initiatives, there will always be tensions between the social
welfare and social control approaches. More important, however, is his
observation that "this tension is inevitable because juvenile justice ju-
risdictions try to combine what cannot be combined satisfactorily."
Walgrave notes that the so-called Beijing rules expressed in the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Children, which are meant to act
as a guide to how young people are dealt with in all countries, "reflect
a fundamental ambivalence" and, in attempting to combine ap-
proaches, might best be described as an attempt to sound good but
gloss over basic incompatibilities between the approaches. The graft-
ing of restorative justice principles onto the unresolved conflict be-
tween welfare and punishment goals obviously leads to other difficul-
ties. Among them, Walgrave suggests that restorative approaches,
when added to this mix of goals, may be vulnerable to all of the existing
criticisms of punishment and treatment approaches.
The stories these essays tell will not provide the thoughtful reader
with a simple solution to the fundamental problems of youth justice,
just as reading about different methods of raising children will not help
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parents know with certainty how best to raise their own. Nevertheless,
the stories about how these countries have developed and modified
their approaches to youthful offending, along with the data they pro-
vide on youth crime and youth justice, provide a background against
which all of us can learn more about the complexity of the problem.
The essays raise important questions about our youth justice sys-
tems. Youth justice systems, and changes in youth justice systems in
particular, as Zimring (2002) suggests, need to be understood in the
context of the criminal justice system that is in place for adults in each
jurisdiction. In Sweden and Denmark, they are one and the same. But
even in those jurisdictions that have formally separate justice systems,
it is worth considering what the relationship is between changes in the
two systems.
We tend to know less than we should about the involvement of the
state in the lives of children during adolescence. Though we know that
in some jurisdictions youths who are heavily involved in the youth jus-
tice system also are likely to have welfare needs, we know little about
the decisions that are made which determine which system is invoked
when both systems could be used and each might be seen as being rele-
vant. Longitudinal studies of youths with representative samples are
not terribly helpful in this regard because relatively few youths ever
come in contact with the formal youth justice or child welfare systems.
Although comparative data across jurisdictions on the relative use of
the two systems do not exist (even where there are separate systems),
these might be useful in understanding the ways in which states inter-
vene in the lives of children. It might be, for example, that jurisdictions
that have low rates of youth court, or criminal law, involvement have
relatively higher rates of some form of state intervention into the lives
of children for welfare purposes. Alternatively, it might be that the so-
cial policies that are likely to affect the level of welfare needs among
children are the same as the policies that affect the level of involvement
in offending. If this were the case, one could expect youth justice and
child welfare rates to be positively correlated across jurisdictions.
In a similar vein, neither within jurisdictions nor across them do we
know much about the reaction of youths to different types of interven-
tions. Little is known about the relative efficacy of interventions in the
two processes.
Nevertheless, the central lesson these essays offer is an important
one: there is not likely to be a single best approach to responding to
youthful offending. There is a good argument for seeing youthful of-
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fending and the youth justice system that responds to it as quite sepa-
rate phenomena. Youthful offending may affect the youth justice sys-
tem, but youth justice systems probably have very little impact on
youthful offending. Some might see this hypothesis as a pessimistic
one. Alternatively, it may free those who are responsible for modifying
youth justice systems to focus more clearly on what is important about
society's responses to crime. What is clear from the essays in this book,
however, is that relatively similar Western countries have not arrived
at a consensus on how best to respond to youth crime.
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